



IS GOVERNANCE IN DEFENCE OF GLOBAL RIGHTS POSSIBLE?

AN APPROACH BASED ON PEACE AND SECURITY, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND HUMAN MOBILITY POLICY¹

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Plataforma 2015 y más

1. INTRODUCTION

This article is part of the Plataforma 2015 y más research project to build a Policy Coherence for Development Index (PCDI). Specifically, it seeks to offer a general approach to a governance framework based on global public interest and global rights and, more concretely, deals with how the policies that are part of said index contribute to this framework of governance.

The article has two basic purposes. The first is to outline a model for global, multilevel governance based on the idea of all the players in international society holding responsibility. It discusses why global governance is important, and provides appropriate principles to help governance respond to development problems and guarantee globally-conceived rights. It then goes on to tackle some of the implications of this notion of governance.

Secondly, the article deals with a set of policies with high potential for putting defence of rights in a global perspective consistent with this concept of governance: peace and security policy, international cooperation policy, and human mobility and migration policy. This section discusses some of the features required for these policies to contribute to a global governance project capable of guaranteeing development for all the world's peoples, based on sustainability and the guarantee of global citizenship rights.

¹ Translated by Virginia Ghent.



2. WHY IS GLOBAL GOVERNANCE IS NECESSARY?

In recent years, we have witnessed major changes in the configuration of development. We are seeing growing interdependence of social, political and economic phenomena, the transformation of development problems worsening, persistence and changes in type of some (Sanahuja, 2013), the increase and transformation of global threats –with the concepts of “involuntary community of risk” (Habermas, 2000) and “world risk society” (Beck, 2002) coming more to the fore– the transnationalization of development (Millán, 2013), and the redefinition of power and subsequent distribution of the capability and responsibility for responding to development problems (Martínez, 2013), among other transformations. In parallel to the emergence of a reconfigured development scenario, new visions and ways of conceiving of development seem to logically and legitimately bring into question any development project not centred around the sustainability of life and the planet (Unceta, 2014). This would include any development or global governance project that is ultimately incapable of bringing the concept of global public interest into line with that which the policies of each community define as their own standards of dignity and wellbeing.

While concern over the need for global governance has grown, within the context of globalisation, development reconfiguration is the phenomenon that is heightening the need for global governance. So, political imperatives involving response to global threats and the securing of global public assets –related to the ethical imperative– must be added to the more conventional concept of public interest. And all this falls within a context in which the emergence of new visions of development, quite different from universalistic, lockstep visions, is called upon to build a model of multilevel governance that focuses on the sustainability of life and of the planet.

The growing interdependence and interrelatedness of processes, policies and players resulting from the scenarios described has helped bring to light the global interdependent nature of development problems, and augment the severity of some of the global threats. It is not that there are new development problems. To the contrary, the new feature is the global interdependent nature, form, and consequences of these problems, as they manifest themselves, and that are now nearing if not surpassing limits, especially environmental and social limits, of sustainability and bringing the future of the planet and world society as we know it into question. In short, the current global coexistence model –the international order based on asymmetries of power, institutions incapable of ensuring general wellbeing, and the predominance on a world scale of a model of production and consumption that preys on the environment and generates inequalities– is the main development problem and the main challenge to governance that



humanity faces. This model, configured as an historical process, is what, after the most recent reconfiguration of development, has rapidly generated today's main global threats: climate change and environmental degradation, poverty and inequality, lack of social protection and exclusion of the most vulnerable groups, and transnational threats to security (Sanahuja *et.al.*, 2013: 22), where "security" is understood to be human security (Núñez *et al.*, 2007).

The response to these global threats, that have become some of the main problems of global development, explains the political imperative that makes the global governance project important.

Yet governance project should not be approached from a rationale of response to so-called development problems, or at least not exclusively so. It would not suffice for a project of this type to deal with problems as they manifest themselves. Instead, it should deal with the configuration of the problems themselves, namely the dynamics, relations and structures that explain how these problems arose in the first place: the existence of global asymmetries, the incapability of institutions to ensure wellbeing and global rights for people, and the existence of an unsustainable model of production and consumption. A global governance project must seek to transform this global model and the problems it generates².

Just as the existence of global threats and the extremely pressing nature of several of them has given greater meaning to the concepts of "involuntary community of risk" and "global risk society", it has also brought to light the international community and its different political players' incapability of providing answers in the face of development problems.

This incapability is not exclusively due to the institutions and public powers' lack of ability to respond to the problems, demands and needs that they were created to meet. What it does highlight is how processes of globalisation and interdependence, including the transnationalisation of development (Millán, 2013), have given rise to a world in which national States are confronting transnational problems which demand solutions with a global multilevel approach. National States are, therefore, political players who, by their very essence, lack the capabilities to respond to global problems.

Although reference is made here fundamentally to national States, we should not overlook the redefinition of power according to which power has been displaced from such States towards varied players in many different directions, giving rise to so-called international society (del Arenal, 2009). In this context the different players, albeit with differences between them,

² It is pertinent at this point to place the global governance project within an ambitious concept of governance (Lafont, 2008) inspired by the idea of post-national cosmopolitanism (Cornago, 2013), as described further on.



wield varying amounts of power and are increasingly able to configure, define and influence global affairs, as well as to respond to the problems of the people. This reconfiguration of power is not normally the result of a process of reflection and dialogue towards reaching a strategic response to problems, based on a multilevel logic including the global perspective. Indeed, the main protagonists of this redefinition of power are, along with the national States, supranational agencies, transnational corporations, non-state governments and civil society organisations that undertake on occasion processes of delegation and transfer of power to find the best answers to the demands and problems of the populace. In many other instances, however, the shift of power is the result of negotiation, dispute-settling or conflict-resolving processes in which the parties are often unequal in status, and only motivated to defend the interests of specific groups.

To a large extent, for this reason, not all shifts of power have the aim, much less the result, of providing the best response to the problems of the populace, thereby contributing to better governance. At times, the power shifts towards players whose goals are not in the general interest through undemocratic mechanisms hidden from public scrutiny. The process of redefining power, therefore, has its limitations and has not contributed to overcoming the insufficiency of “national” solutions to dealing with problems that are increasingly global in nature.

It is necessary, though not in itself sufficient, for the different political players to undertake complementary, multilevel action in a power reconfiguration scenario. Any global governance project able to ensure global public interest and defend global rights in the response to development problems must reject the idea that equates governance with “multilateralisation” in decision-making and resources, and advocate multilevel, democratic global governance instead (Sassen, 2007).

It is globality and interdependence that transcend and overwhelm the capabilities of national players. Global governance must therefore include international society as a whole, deal with redefining power and generate capabilities for responding to development problems.

The fact is that at present there is no governance framework of this type. This does not prevent us from acknowledging the existence of regulatory and institutional developments which act as a sort of framework for “minimal” global governance. In truth, however, the advances achieved at the regulatory and institutional levels, although quite relevant and valuable, are not sufficient, and continue to depend to a large extent on decisions (interests, visions and identities) based on a national perspective.



It is in this two-sided scenario of development problems and global threats, on the one hand, and limitations on the part of States (and the other political and social players that make up international society) to ensuring democratic governance and solutions to global problems on the other (Sanahuja *et al.*, 2013: 21), where the need for a sufficient global governance framework makes complete sense. Without denying the strong regulatory component involved, the construction of global governance therefore amounts to linking satisfaction of global public interest (not only from a point of view of ensuring the security of society vis-à-vis the global risk from threats against it, but also from a concept of global rights) to development of a political community able to go beyond the limitations arising from the rationale of national interest and capabilities.

3. FROM POWER TO RESPONSIBILITY: GLOBAL PUBLIC INTEREST AND GLOBAL RIGHTS AS PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNANCE

The construction of processes and frameworks for global multilevel democratic governance involves transforming views regarding the very idea of governance, which is often approached from the conventional view of concentration of power as a mechanism for guaranteeing security and stability.

From this perspective, power must shift from being the central axis around which international relations are configured, since this is no longer, if ever it was, the most effective way to achieve peace and stability. Since the nature of many of the threats to stability and security has changed and new ones have appeared on the scene –threats to environmental and social sustainability must now be added to the classic notion of threats to security– power is now displaced as a central point of reference for governance (Blin and Marin, 2007). The idea of shared responsibility in meeting global threats, as opposed to the traditional dominance of the notion of power, becomes a central reference point in the configuration of global governance processes.

Therefore, building global governance based on the idea of responsibility needs to be aimed at seeking sustainable responses to the global threats and development problems that affect all the players in international society. This is not possible, however, without trying to transform the relations, dynamics, logic, ideas and values that comprise them. It is precisely the transformation of the structural elements that give rise to global threats –smoothing global asymmetries, transforming the international order, international bodies and the dominant model of production and consumption, among others– what here has been called the “global coexistence model”, that will make it possible to develop a framework for governance through which to respond



to development problems in a sustainable way and from a global rights perspective.

The ideas of sustainability and safeguarding rights are, therefore, fundamental to the global governance project put forth here, and establish a clear position in the existing discussion of different governance models. This discussion includes ambitious governance concepts alongside weaker positions that, in turn, involve strong governance models rather than minimalistic models (Lafont, 2008)³, similar to the complex structure of international regulations and institutions that currently exist (and which correspond to a “Westphalian” world). It is therefore important to state that what is advocated here is a strong global governance model (Lafont, 2008), based on the concept of “post-national cosmopolitanism,” and the idea of shared responsibility, that seeks to guarantee global rights through recognition of the existence (as well as the promotion and guarantee) of global public interest.

In truth, in a “Westphalian” world, it is impossible to guarantee wellbeing and the rights of the world’s citizens as a whole. Although many differences exist between one State and another, it is still nationality that determines rights and responsibilities and which is therefore the main way at present to guarantee individuals their rights. It is unquestionably an anachronistic and ineffectual means in a hugely interdependent world with global exchange dynamics, in which the link between “nationality” and “rights” makes increasingly less sense.

Although not legally recognised, it is the very idea of global, right-holding citizenship, in conjunction with the “global risk society” (Beck, 2002) that makes the notion of global public interest⁴ and responsibility thereto, meaningful.

³ It can be said that there is some correspondence between these concepts and the different visions of global public interest, such as Republican and social notions or Liberalism (Cornago, 2013: 4). Furthermore, these different approaches to governance arise from different currents of cosmopolitanism, including “post-national cosmopolitanism” and “moderate cosmopolitanism” (Cornago, 2013: 9).

⁴ Global public interest is indeterminate as a concept and what it entails depends to a large extent on the approaches or notions that inspire it (Cornago, 2013: 4). For the approach of interest here, a vision of “global public interest” that is built from a political vision that seeks to go beyond the “moderate cosmopolitanism” that is based on utilitarian philosophy, on (European) liberal political thought and on neoclassical economics (Cornago, 2013: 9), is especially relevant. Despite the criticism that may be levelled at “post-national cosmopolitanism” as an inspiration because it distances itself from interest in transformations of international law (Cornago, 2013), this approach is of interest because of its regulatory value and its symbolic power and reality-building ability, since it conceives of the idea of global public interest as “global citizenship” rights. In the words of Cornago, the concept of global public interest “has a great ability to call attention to a certain idea of collective responsibility and common good” (Cornago, 2013: 11). Therefore, a major part of the value of the concept of “global public interest” lies in the fact that it requires changes to be made in the structure of the international order (Cornago, 2013, p. 13). For global public interest to take shape, the notion of national sovereignty must be put aside in areas such



Logically, advocacy of a strong model of governance entails major challenges: correction of global asymmetries, transformation of the international order and international bodies, multilevel structuring and transformation of the dominant model of production and consumption, among other factors, which condemns it, at least in the medium term, to remaining at the regulatory level and, in the best of cases, making only partial, limited progress.

Despite this, and without ignoring the enormous difficulties that a process of this dimension entails, there are sufficient factors to justify advocacy from academic, political and social circles for building an ambitious governance model. Contributions towards a better characterisation and justification of this model of governance can help shift aspirations for global governance from the regulatory standpoint to a more positive plane. Some of the most relevant factors that such a characterisation would need to take into account are: the different areas of structural power that exist and that give rise to the violation of human rights⁵, transnationalisation and the growing interdependence of players, policies and social, economic, political and cultural processes resulting from the process of globalisation; and the complex nature and severity of development problems and global threats. To have an impact on any one of these factors, much less all of them, requires leaving the exclusive national viewpoint behind and putting an ambitious governance model into service.

Just as the factors justifying advocacy of a specific model of governance need to be set forth, we should not overlook alternative elements that significantly hamper its construction and place it in the category of “wishful thinking”. Without providing an exhaustive or in-depth characterisation of the elements limiting governance⁶, their importance can be demonstrated by citing some of the more obvious examples: the hegemony of the “national view” and the “Westphalian” characterisation of the world, in which the nation-state continues to be the principal point of reference in the construction of interests and identities (Sanahuja *et al.*, 2013: 22), with major resistance to giving up sovereignty in order to deal with global problems (Ivanova, 2011: 8-9)⁷; the absence of a globally shared, identity-generating,

as the economy, social policy, culture and technology, so as to be able to go forward and build global governance centred around global public interest (Cornago, 2013, p. 13). An in-depth discussion of the concept of “global public interest” can be found in Cornago (2013).

⁵ Lafont’s defence of an ambitious global governance model is of interest (Lafont, 2008). She argues that there is no basis for establishing any significant regulatory distinction between the massive violation of human rights due to armed conflicts and those due to economic regulation.

⁶ For a more in-depth analysis of the elements that limit construction of governance, see Ivanova (Ivanova, 2011) and Sanahuja *et al.* (2013).

⁷ With regard to interests, the idea of the “national building of interests” allows for some nuance. There are other concepts, such as “public interest-private interest,” that may be more decisive than alternative sources of interest building. In fact, far from attempting to simplify this issue,



moral and ethical paradigm (Blin and Marin, 2007; Ivanova, 2011)⁸; and the shortfall of global institutions (Sanahuja et al., 2013: 22) in terms of legitimacy, authority, capability and transparency (Ivanova, 2011: 9).

Setting forth some of the limiting elements of governance, even without evaluating them, is indicative of the difficult challenges inherent in building an ambitious governance framework. Nonetheless, the seriousness of the consequences of not doing so suggests that this model of governance based on responsibility and collective action and commonwealth is the only realistic solution to global problems.

Ultimately, since the concept and the model of governance outlined here face enormous implementation difficulties and require the transformation of many elements that make up globalised reality (approaches to the model of governance itself, the attitudes of the different players, the system of values and interests, the scope of structural power...), the construction of global governance cannot be approached as an “integrated project”. Quite to the contrary, it is an historic process under constant construction, promoted (both consciously and unconsciously) by numerous groups and areas such as politics, academia, and civil society. In this regard, it is certainly relevant to generate knowledge that helps warrant its implementation, that inspire institutional reforms aimed at “governance building” and that determine how policies with this goal are implemented. Specifically, this involves encouraging the generation of knowledge, narrative and meaning to produce a framework favourable to building global governance that can safeguard global public interest and global rights.

4. POLICIES FOR GOVERNANCE

In a world that continues to be shaped to a large extent by the acts of national States and in an international space that is fundamentally shaped by decisions and policies generated therefrom (based on the national sovereignty rationale), political analysis becomes crucial in building a framework favourable to global governance based on global public interest and the safeguarding of global rights.

Transnationalization and interdependence help reconfigure the situation through a process of “de-territorialisation and re-anchoring” (Millán *et al.*, 2012: 13), highlighting the intermestic nature –in which the international

certain interests (built as “private interest”) are frequently projected as national interests when they could more appropriately be defined as the interests of certain groups within a State, and even not necessarily limited to same. This applies, for instance, to the interest configuration of transnational private players.

⁸ The existence of global threats that has been translated into the idea of “global risk society” leads to the idea of shared interests, and hence of “general public interest.” Its potential for generating shared identity is, nonetheless, irrelevant.



and domestic implications of a specific reality are no longer separated into distinct compartments— of every policy that impacts on the organisation of life in society. All policies (including those apparently more oriented towards regulating domestic affairs) are therefore relevant, though to differing degrees, to global governance and the safeguarding of global rights.

The following is a brief discussion of policies on peace and security, international development cooperation, and human mobility and human migration from the standpoint of their contribution (or potential contribution) to global governance based on global public interest and guarantee of global rights. This discussion led to the inclusion of these three policies in the construction of a Policy Coherence for Development Index.

A. PEACE AND SECURITY

The peace and security policy included in the analysis of the PCDI deals with a concept of human security that links peace and security with development (Núñez *et al.*, 2007; Sanahuja and Schünemann, 2012: 25). In contrast to conventional approaches, this proposes changing both the objective of security—from defence of national interests to defence of the human right to security—and the means to achieve it, from a military approach to an approach based on preventive diplomacy and the construction of conditions and capabilities for peace. National security, therefore, becomes one means, among others, of guaranteeing human security, and not an end in itself (Núñez *et al.*, 2007: 12). From this standpoint, peace and security are considered both a necessary condition and a result of development. In other words, it is not possible to envision human development without ensuring the human right to a life under conditions of security (Núñez *et al.*, 2007: 12).

This perspective brings into the discussion the very nature of the concept of security. Now that global threats can no longer be explained solely in conventional terms of “security,” reflection can take place on the concept of security as a whole and, by extension, of the policies, strategies, mechanisms and players that are in charge of ensuring it. Peace and security policy, not even foreign policy as a whole, cannot be considered, therefore, as an area that is separate from government action, but rather one that responds to a broader overall strategy for achieving development goals.

An approach to peace and security policy based on a human security perspective has a number of implications that would make a potential contribution to development and global governance. And they are elements that any peace and security policy aimed at global governance needs to take into consideration.



The first is a security perspective that focuses on the human being, a fundamental change since it no longer considers security objectives in national terms but places human beings, irrespective of citizenship or place of residence, at the centre of security. It is the idea of shared global threats that makes the Habermasian concept of “involuntary community of risk” meaningful (Habermas, 2000), while the subsequent characterisation of the “global risk society” (Beck, 2002) best illustrates the meaninglessness of making national security an end in itself.

Secondly, and as a result of this, the approach in question requires a major shift in vision from the national to the multilateral sphere (Núñez *et al.*, 2007), since the individual is understood as part of international society.

Thirdly, human security, as a global objective, requires relinquishment of sovereignty to put into place integrated global governance mechanisms and processes that are capable of responding to global threats and development problems, and thereby guarantee security. From the conventional perspective of security, national responses can also be considered insufficient and the multilateral approach is therefore necessary, as is the relinquishment of sovereignty this entails. Yet it is the integrated nature and interdependent configuration of problems and their manifestation as threats that require collective, integrated action which more clearly highlights the shortfall in national responses. The State alone cannot tackle these new forms of violence and threats to human security, and the national dimension, while still necessary, has become ineffective and insufficient in dealing with security issues that are increasingly more transnational and interdependent in nature⁹.

Fourthly, it involves accepting a preventive and political rationale based on strengthening capabilities for building peace versus the more reactive, militaristic rationale of conventional security approaches. Under this preventive and political security logic, political, economic and social instruments are considered the most effective means to achieve peace and build a more just and secure world (Núñez *et al.*, 2007: 10).

Fifthly, and clearly related to the move from a reactive to a preventive and political rationale, the human security approach requires a shift from a one-dimensional to an integrated multidimensional vision of security. The goals of human security cannot be pursued exclusively by a policy of “peace and security” and its instruments, or even through all the areas involved in

⁹ This aspiration should not be interpreted as the disappearance or dilution of national states as political entities with responsibilities in the context of peace and security policy or in foreign policy as a whole. This, apart from being highly unlikely, would not be desirable. To the contrary, it counts on the national state as a fundamental player in developing appropriate peace and security policies, in addition to global governance. The aim here is to indicate the need to develop capabilities so that States will be effective in their contribution to the global objective of human security.



states' foreign policy, without taking into account all the other policies that shape development policy and respond to global threats. While it is true that some of these policies fall within or in the proximity of foreign policy –such as cooperation policy, human mobility and migration policy, and certain areas of economic policy– as threats to security increase, the aims of other policies whose nature and objectives are apparently unrelated to peace and security policy and foreign policy –including social protection policies, equality policies, and education and health policies– become fundamental.

Just as other policies must ensure attainment of the objectives of peace and security, this integrated approach also requires a broader, more transversal and integrated view of peace and security policy objectives themselves. This means integrating all the dimensions of development over which global threats are configured and manifested into the objectives of peace and security. Environmental degradation is certainly one of the clearest threats to human security, either through climate change, loss of biodiversity or scarcity of resources (Núñez *et al.*, 2007: 14). Together with the environmental dimension, the existence of major social inequality and the implementation of economic policies that cause environmental degradation and the systematic violation of human rights indicate how deep, complex and interrelated these threats are. An approach to peace and security policy from a human-security perspective must therefore include much broader concepts and objectives, including sustainability, guarantee of rights, social cohesion, justice and protection of human rights.

Once the implications of a broad approach to human security are taken into account, peace and security policy will better be able to contribute to development and global governance.

B. DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

One of the fundamental objectives of the PCDI is to compare different countries' policies based on the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities which, as stated previously, is a fundamental principle in global governance processes. In the case of development cooperation, by its very nature, this objective requires addressing cooperation policy using a different perspective from the more conventional analysis of cooperation, generally based on roles differentiated between donors and recipients.

According to conventional analysis, development cooperation is a system of relationships between players in the international system that is aimed at supporting different countries' development. The system includes players of different types, with different interests, motivations and approaches, and that take action through different means, instruments and tools of cooperation to improve the social conditions and the economic and environmental policies of lesser developed countries.



Under this system, donor and recipient countries have different functions and responsibilities depending on the role they play in the international cooperation system. Donors, who are responsible for supporting recipients' development processes, are scrutinised fundamentally on the basis of the magnitude of their development aid efforts and on the quality and effectiveness of the aid policies they implement. Recipient countries, whose role has traditionally been more passive, are usually considered responsible at the lower levels of the so-called "aid chain" (Martínez, 2007; Rodríguez-Carmona, 2004; Sogge, 1998). The scrutiny to which recipients are subjected is usually related to the degree of transparency and accountability of the management of the aid received, and the achievement of development objectives, generally at the local or national level.

But neither do cooperation policies respond exclusively to development interests and objectives, nor is the development rationale explicable from a linear perspective, under which some countries enjoy a higher level of development than others and bolstering development processes would help align development levels. The dynamics of poverty and exclusion, growing inequality, climate change phenomena and environmental degradation have been both generators and objects of profound change (Sanahuja, 2013), and can no longer be explained on a national rationale. Instead, they are increasingly linked to transnational dynamics and therefore require complex joint responses. Development problems and global threats are, as has already been stated, affected by global asymmetries and by policy implementation (at both the national and international levels), as well as by production and consumption models. Any solution to these problems that seeks to be global and sustainable cannot, therefore, be conceived or implemented on the basis of the partial, technocratic rationale in which international development cooperation has traditionally been immersed, with special emphasis on the so-called "aid effectiveness agenda" (Unceta, 2013).

It would therefore be advisable to build the index using a different approach from the conventional international cooperation viewpoint, not only for methodological reasons, but also for other theoretical and conceptual reasons that support a different stance on international cooperation and countries' policy implementation efforts.

As with peace and security policy, development cooperation is one of the policies that potentially make the most relevant contribution to global governance and guaranteeing global rights. In the project to build a PCDI, cooperation policy is therefore approached through a transition to development policy (Alonso, 2012) and consequently oriented towards international development objectives, based on its contribution to global governance spaces and mechanisms.



One reason for analysing international cooperation from a perspective that considers contribution to global development is the limitations imposed by the very nature of aid when conceived in conventional terms and instrumentalized through donor-recipient relations. Development aid and the system of international cooperation of which it is part are subject to a series of restrictions and contradictions that seriously limit the effectiveness of development promotion and lessen its ability to become a global governance mechanism. The voluntary, unregulated and fragmentary nature of the aid system enables donors to exercise high degrees of discretionality in decision-making, leading to atomised action (Alonso, 2005; Martínez, 2010: 92-95; Sanahuja, 2007).

Only insofar as aid policies and the development cooperation system as a whole become transformed and are able to overcome some of their limiting factors will a transition towards a more relevant system of global development and governance (Severino and Ray, 2009) be possible. At a time when sustainable development objectives are being defined, the changes in the international development agenda and in the international aid system through the revision of the very concept itself and how to measure it, come at an opportune moment to transform this international agenda and the system of development governance needed to transition towards a global development policy.

It would appear that there are therefore sufficient reasons to develop a more global approach to international cooperation policy, one that diverges from the conventional concept of official development aid delegated and deployed through donor-recipient relations.

C. HUMAN MOBILITY AND MIGRATION

Human mobility is one of the clearest examples of the existence of what Ulrich Beck defines as the “global risk society” (2002) and the limited ability of national states to respond to these global dynamics. Global threats in the form of climate change and the loss of biodiversity, different types of violence, poverty, social exclusion and discrimination on the basis of gender, ethnicity, religion or sexual identity, are factors largely responsible for human mobility and migration.

As such threats emerge and intensify, human mobility and migration will grow (Nail, 2015: 187), becoming increasingly global in nature. This intensification and its globality make migration and human mobility one of the fundamental challenges to a global governance that can guarantee global citizenship rights, including those of migrants and displaced persons, irrespective of their legal status in the country of asylum¹⁰.

¹⁰ The issue of the legal status of migrants is extremely relevant in the analysis of migration in general, and particularly in the quantitative analysis aimed at building a Policy Coherence for Development Index. The existence of irregular status emigrants complicates the analysis,



This globality and its significance for global governance is why human mobility and migration policy is included in the analysis of the policies that have high potential to shape and strengthen spaces of global governance and guaranteed global rights.

In response to the intermestic character required of any analysis of human mobility and migration, a substantial part of the work to construct the PCDI tackles the management of international asylum by different countries, and refugee and migratory movement phenomena. The analysis explores the regulatory dimension, through scrutiny of the degree of different countries' commitment to signing and ratifying international treaties on migration and mobility, as well as their openness to providing asylum and refugee status to immigrants and displaced persons.

Another part of the approach to human mobility and migration policy that the PCDI analysis seeks to inspire involves the "domestic" or internal aspect of migrations, albeit with no fewer consequences regarding levels of overall wellbeing, human security and contribution to the protection of global citizenship rights. In this case, the spotlight is on the political, economic and social dimensions. It is fundamental, therefore, to analyse the degree of recognition of the rights of migrant collectives' to political participation in the country of asylum, the ease of and openness to hiring foreign workers and, fundamentally, the degree of social cohesion and protection people and immigrant groups have, as well as the degree to which the society is intercultural.

The social, political, economic and cultural integration of immigrants and immigrant groups is fundamental, not only so that migration does not increase the social divide, but also to generate greater social cohesion. In this regard, there is a clear need to go beyond a partial viewpoint locked into a specific, generally economic, dimension (Ivakhnyuk and Taran, 2009: 14), and face the need for a multidimensional approach to human mobility and migration.

An empirical, multidimensional analysis in each country, as proposed by the PCDI, is an enormously complex endeavour, especially in the domestic scenario. There is a dearth of statistics, as they are restricted to a very limited number of countries, and a large part of the migrants fall outside them because of their irregular status. This difficulty was partly dealt with when building the PCDI by resorting to transversality and by conducting an analysis of social cohesion and of the scope of the political, economic and social freedoms enjoyed in the different countries.

hampering efforts to quantify the entire migratory phenomenon as required when building the PCDI. This limitation is all the more relevant when analysis is approached in terms of global citizenship rights, with countries in which a high percentage of the population does not possess legal citizenship status due to their irregular status (in some case close to 20%). This complicates and significantly limits any political analysis based on equality and freedom, and aimed at universality (Nail, 2015: 187).



5. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS: SOME ANALYTICAL LIMITATIONS

The purpose of this article is to establish a frame of reference within which to build a Policy Coherence for Development Index, particularly in relation to the model of governance to which policies seek to contribute and to highlight three key integral policies: peace and security policy, international cooperation policy and human mobility and migration policy.

Nonetheless, as with any attempt at measurement that is based on a predetermined theoretical framework or idea, as it stands, the PCDI-building exercise presents a number of difficulties, some common to the overall policies included in the PCDI, and others specifically related to the policies dealt with in this article. These warrant explicit mention to ensure that the limits of the analysis are clearly defined.

A recurring issue that hampers policy measurement is the absence of information systems and solid statistics for the countries overall, which would make it possible to include the different perspectives of each of the policies.

Without overlooking this limitation, as far as possible, partial interpretations of each of the policies analysed should be eschewed, both those presented in this article and those that are part of the PCDI overall. Specifically, given our advocacy of an integrated multidimensional approach, the proposed analysis would only make sense to the extent that it interacts with the rest of the analyses of other policies, thus achieving the integration sought. Only from that overall perspective can the inevitable divide between theory and measurement that conditions the PCDI be minimised. 🍷



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